Wagner and China: The final curtain or an encore still to come?
Wagner and China: The final curtain or an encore still to come?
Jocelyn Chey

Wagner and China: The final curtain or an encore still to come?

For a few days, China, like the rest of the world, was transfixed by the Wagner Groups tactical advance on Moscow, threatening the stability of the Russian government and the rule of President Vladimir Putin before the challenge collapsed suddenly.

The mercenary army plot was worthy of the composer Richard Wagner, for whom the Group is named, with a dramatic build-up and suspense sustained until the final curtain. The reviews of this military opera are now being read and studied in Beijing.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has been long committed to consolidating relations with Russia and has engaged warmly with Putin, describing him publicly as his best friend. This has resulted in a de facto alliance that has served to offset to some degree the deterioration of relations with the United States and the Western world. Although official statements depict China-Russia relations as a partnership between equals, actually for some years China has held most of the cards, had a stronger economy and wielded more international influence than Russia. Russia needs China far more than the other way around, although Russia can also supply China with oil and gas and, importantly, has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

Viewed from the Chinese perspective, Russia does serve an important function to distract and preoccupy American and European strategists who might otherwise take greater issue with Chinese disruptive actions. Compared with Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere, China appears more conservative and responsible.

The brief rebellion led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group, threatened to upset the current delicate balance of China-Russia relations. A more unstable Russia would portend its diminished ability to support China in the eventuality of serious conflict with the US. No surprise then that Chinese government spokespersons waited some time before delivering an official assessment of the uprising it was Russias internal affair, according to Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning on 26 June. China supports Russia in maintaining national stability and achieving development and prosperity.

National stability is the watchword of Xi Jinpings statecraft, as he constantly monitors developments across his vast and complex nation, suppressing any signs of potential alternative power bases, whether local independence movements or aggressive commercial entities. There is no equivalent of the Wagner Group in China. The military is tightly controlled, and military commanders work with equal-ranked Party commissars who ensure they remain loyal to the Party and government. Chinese private security companies do exist but they are active only at the local level.

Chinese officials no doubt believe that Putin has been at fault for allowing a group such as Wagner to develop to the stage at which it has presented a threat to the national government. They will learn from this Wagner plot that such a scenario in China must be prevented at all costs. They are however unlikely to voice this publicly because this could be taken as personal criticism of Xi Jinpings best friend.

The Wagner rebellion arose out of its engagement by Russia in the invasion of Ukraine. It is Ukraine, not Wagner, that presents a longer-term challenge to Putins government. It is therefore significant that China is exerting itself to resolve the Ukraine crisis through peacemaking efforts, appointing a former ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, as envoy, and establishing direct communication between Xi and Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

So far, there are few signs of breakthrough, but Foreign Minister Qin Gang made Ukraine a focus of discussions during his visit to Europe in May. In late June, Fu Cong, Chinese envoy to the European Union, suggested to Al Jazeera that China could back Ukraines goal of regaining territories that it lost to Russia such as Crimea, saying,

We respect the territorial integrity of all countries. So when China established relations with the former Soviet Union, thats what we agreed. But as I said, these are historical issues that need to be negotiated and resolved by Russia and Ukraine and that is what we stand for.

Fu Cong had made similar comments earlier, for instance in April in an interview with the New York Times, when he said Beijing did not recognise Moscows annexation of Crimea and the Donbas, but this time he doubled down on his remarks, even reminding listeners that there is a parallel situation on Chinas northern border with Russia.

The parallel derives from the annexation from China in the 1850s by the former Russian Empire of a large part of Siberia through a series of unequal treaties forced upon the weak Qing Dynasty. The two countries concluded negotiations of the Siberian frontier only in 2008 and nationalist grievances about this loss of territory continue to fester in the Chinese social media. Siberia is vast and lightly populated, while China is densely settled. Siberia has access to the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. There are clear benefits to China if this territory could be regained. If Putin and his government were weaker, because of the Wagner rebellion or a prolonged stalemate in Ukraine, this historical issue could be reopened. The final curtain of the Wagner opera might be raised for an encore.

Contemporary China has embraced western classical music with a passion, including Wagners complex and challenging operas. Several have been performed recently by local and touring opera companies, most recently The Flying Dutchman by the Shanghai Opera Company and German Theater Erfurt. Readers who are intrigued by such cultural connections may like to read a review of a Russian performance of Parsifal in Nanjing in 2019 by Pearls and Irritations’ regular contributor Colin Mackerras.