Chinas capacity to surprise western politicians was demonstrated recently, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping was unexpectedlyabsentfrom the G20 summit. There were a few reasons why this G20 might have been less important for Xi, including the rising influence of theBrics(Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) partnership.

But often western reactions to a Chinese decision can come from a lack of understanding of Beijings motivations. A deeper knowledge of China would help the west interpret Beijings actions more clearly, helpful at a time wheremany analystssee China as a potential challenger to the US as the dominant world power. With this in mind, here are five things that the west often gets wrong about Chinese foreign policy.

1. Its not a grand scheme

In the western media, Chinese foreign policy has often been seen as agrand schemeto secure world leadership. Such an image has been popular with western politicians, such as South Dakota governor Kristi Noem, who claimed that China had a 2000-year plan to destroy the US.

However, Chinese policy is not quite the labyrinthine plot that it has often been presented as. An example of this can be seen in Wolf Warrior diplomacy, which has often interpreted as a long-term, calculated strategy of Chinese aggression to western leaders. But another way of looking at Wolf Warrior diplomacy is as an opportunisticresponseto the bellicose rhetoric of the former US president Donald Trumps administration as well as a need to cater to nationalism at home. Showing Chinese leaders talking tough to their foreign counterparts also plays well with a domestic audience, and can divert attention from a poorly performing economy.

Equally, grander Chinese initiatives, such as the Belt and the Road Initiative (BRI), which provides aid and finance to African and South American countries to create new infrastructure, may also have been created as a response to outside developments, particularlythe USpivottowards expanding its influence in Asia, from 2010. Chinese foreign policy has largely been devised in response to recent developments rather than being along-term schemefor domination.

2. China deals with democracies

Another common fear is that Beijing hasencouragedthe rise of political authoritarianism in other countries. TheChinese model of economic developmenthas racheted up fears of China attempting tospreadits political system beyond its national borders. But, some of the biggest advocates of the China model have been thepolitical elitesin developing nations, many of whom have a colonial history, and who appreciate that China offers an alternative to the west in attracting investment.

Overall though, Beijing generally takes alaissez-faireapproach towards the internal politics of its partners, with China beingwillingto deal with democracies and dictatorships, rather than forcing its partners to fall in line with its own political system.

3. Chinas role in the world order

One of the most common depictions of China in recent years has been of it asa revisionist powerthat seeks to overthrow the liberal rules-based world order and international bodies. Such an image was popularised by Graham Allisons 2017 bookDestined for War, which warned of a China seeking to overthrow US domination. It presents the China/US relationship as the latest in the long line of great power relationships that follow the same pattern.

However, while China wishes toamendcertain areas of the post-Cold War system, most notably it being centred around the US and liberal values, it does notwishto fully overturn the whole system. For instance, China has played a significant part in established international bodies, such as the United Nations. China was also one of the primarybeneficiariesof post-Cold War globalisation, with Chinas rapid development being achieved partially through this economic model.

4. Chinas historical experience

One of the greatest challenges posed by Chinese foreign policy is that it questions many of the dominant understandings of international relations, which have been grounded in theexperiencesof the west.

But China draws on a different history, one that includes its own dominant position internationally, but also its defeat and occupation. Beijing references thispastwhen talking of the Century of Humiliation (1839-1949), a period when China was dominated and occupied by colonial powers. This powerful image can rally the domestic population as well as building a common cause with developing nations, many of which are former colonies themselves.

Chinas golden ages of the Han, Tang and Song dynasties (202BC-1279) has also influenced Chinese thinking. This was a time of huge cultural and economic influence, with Asia trade centred around the Silk Road. TheSilk Roadrefers to an historical network of highly lucrative trade routes linking a powerful China to the rest of the world, and used to sell its products for centuries. Its ambitions to build a new version of this can be seen in the BRI, which gives China a new Silk Road. It is by understanding the logic behind these legacies that one can see Chinese foreign policy more clearly.

5. The appeal of Chinese aid

Chinas financial aid and investment projects in developing countries are sometimes portrayed as simplybribingcorrupt states or ensnaring them with debt trap diplomacy.

While these images have been popular in western mediacoverageof Chinese foreign policy, they overlook the role of the country receiving aid tochoose to acceptChinese finance and how this also appeals as an alternative to western aid packages which traditionally come with many conditions relating to governance.

Chinese military leader and strategistSun Tzuonce emphasised the importance of knowing ones enemies as well as oneself; these words are especially pertinent in understanding China today.

First published in THE CONVERSATION October 3, 2023