With the United States and China locked in an ongoing battle and no solution in sight, Kevin Rudd from Queensland is here to help. His new book explains President Xi Jinping’s thinking and suggests a way forward. Are people paying attention? If they are, will they learn anything useful?

In March 2023 Kevin Rudd became Australia’s Ambassador to the US. At the time, people wondered about the appointment of a noted China expert. Could he set out Australia’s views and help prevent a war that would be a global disaster. So far, he has had little effect. Both sides of US politics are united in anti-China views. Rudd is a staunch supporter of AUKUS and warns of China’s expansionist ambitions. Although Donald Trump has called Rudd “nasty” and threatened to get rid of him if he wins election, Foreign Minister Penny Wong has said he will remain. Perhaps he still has a chance to bring about change, but that seems unlikely.

Rudd’s book comprehensively sets out his pessimistic view of China. Despite his demanding Washington ambassadorial role, he has found time to polish his 2022 Oxford University doctoral thesis, adding some new analysis. On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World quotes extensively from speeches and essays by Chinese President Xi to demonstrate how China’s current policies and practices are linked his commitment to Marxist ideology. Xi’s body of writing has been elevated to the level of “Xi Jinping Thought” and is promulgated and studied nationwide, setting the parameters for policy and practice. Rudd argues that it is important to understand Xi’s ideology because it affects the development of policy in the economy, government and all areas of public life by defining what are acceptable limits for change.

Rudd argues that, ten years ago, following his succession to the office of President, Xi moved to the Leninist Left by elevating the status of both the Communist Party (CPC) and the leader in the Party and by strengthening discipline in the Party and the media. A few years later, he again moved to the Marxist Left, reinstating Mao’s ideological priorities and reversing Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on the economy. At the 19th National Party Congress in 2017, Xi defined ideology as the “central contradiction” (in Marxist terminology) and began rectification of the Party because of concerns about the growth of corruption and internal dissension. Thirdly, Rudd asserts that Xi has moved to the Nationalist Right, promoting patriotism and committing the nation to struggle for reform of the international system. This ideological development provoked confrontation with the US that continues to the present day.

There is a particular skill required to read CPC documents, as I found decades ago when I started reading mainland Chinese newspapers, searching for clues to developments in Party policies that might influence their Cold War activities. Rudd has waded through reams of papers and provides useful summaries and commentaries. I do not agree with all his conclusions, however, and therefore also differ from his predictions about the future direction of Chinese politics, as in his recent presentation to CSIS at Harvard University. To borrow from Rudd’s style (in turn inspired by CPC usage), I propose three criticisms.

Firstly, any evolution or development of an ideology or philosophy must be considered in the context of the personal, historical and contemporary environment. Plato and Aristotle cannot be understood without knowing about the political situation in ancient Athens. Contemporary China is no exception. Rudd is less concerned with why Mao, Deng, Xi and others espoused ideological positions than with what they said and wrote, but the two cannot be separated. I will give two examples. It was after corruption emerged as the top matter of public concern in the first decades of this century that Xi developed his so-called “Marxist Left” ideology, and it must be evaluated against this background. Again, political and economic competition with the US and Xi’s so-called “Nationalist Right” ideology emerged following the Obama administration’s proposal of the “Pivot to Asia” and the strengthening of US defence ties with Japan. This led to China’s growing fear of encirclement and a more muscular foreign policy.

Secondly, Xi Jinping’s opinions did not spring from his mind fully formed. As John Donne observed, “No man is an island”. His ideological position arose from his family and formal education and was influenced and moulded by his peers and his life journey. Again, I give one example: Wang Huning is the most influential adviser to Xi Jinping, as Chris Buckley has noted. Wang has been involved in the development of CPC ideology since the 1980s and is a close and trusted associate of Xi, but he is not referenced in Rudd’s book. Rudd argues that Xi Jinping Thought lives or dies with Xi the man, but I believe that this ideology belongs to the whole cohort of Chinese baby boomers (Xi and Wang were born in 1953 and 1955). Later generations will undoubtedly have different worldviews.

Thirdly, and most fundamentally, Chinese ideology is materialist in spirit and origin, both Marxist and Confucian. It is no coincidence that the chief CPC theoretical journal is titled Qiushi (Seeking truth), a direct quote from Han dynasty historian Ban Gu, who wrote about the requirement for knowledge to be based on facts. Mao Zedong adopted this adage and used the term in his writings. Chinese domestic and international policies and practices are above all pragmatic, and follow the Golden Rule of Confucianism, “Do not do to others what you would not want others to do to you” (Analects 15.24). Chinese ideology comes from practice not from ideals.

Let us hope that American and Australian policy makers abandon the suspicion and isolationism of Kevin Rudd’s book. They will learn more from talking directly to counterparts in China.