I visited Beijing in December for the first time since COVID, at the invitation of Renmin University and the Beijing Municipal Government. As well as attending the major conference they were hosting, I was keen to catch up with members of the network of public administration scholars I had helped to establish 15 years ago.

That network, the Greater China Australia Dialogue on Public Administration, produced a series of edited books and journal symposiums exploring how the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan and Australia were addressing common public administration challenges such as intergovernmental relations, financial management, urban governance and the use of technology. The latest book (_Dilem_mas in Public Management in Greater China and Australia) published in 2023 reflects on more recent developments in the context of rising international tensions which have highlighted the underlying differences between democratic Australia and authoritarian China, accentuated under Xi Jinping.

Our conclusion about China under Xi Jinping in that book was: it’s complicated. On this very brief visit, I wanted to test firsthand that conclusion in the current apparently less confrontational waters.

Beijing’s ‘12345’ public complaints system

The conference (Beijing Forum on Swift Response to Public Complaints) was itself a demonstration of China’s renewed desire to engage internationally after Xi’s earlier “wolf warrior” stance, and it revealed some positive political developments as well as China’s impressive use of technology. It was also undoubtedly a propaganda exercise.

The central focus of the conference was Beijing’s “12345” public complaints system: a phone number any of Beijing’s population of 22 million can ring to make a complaint about anything. Orders of magnitude greater than any “Fix my Road” system here, “12345” is claimed to handle any number of public concerns from housing to pensions, to urban congestion and car parking, to aged care. It uses multiple languages and support for complainants with disabilities such as deafness. Think in terms of connecting every government website and call centre in Australia — Commonwealth state and local — and being accessible to all.

The technology to support the system is stunning. AI to help call centre staff to provide accurate information and to direct complainants to appropriate agencies and people to investigate. Monitoring systems to track the resolution of complaints, ensure call centre staff do not lose their cool when responding to feisty complainants (voice sound levels are constantly measured and appear above every desk), and to provide constant performance reports for every district within Beijing. Huge screens show real-time numbers of complaints, the issues involved, and resolution levels. Performance reports affect the standing of the Communist Party of China (CPC) leaders in each district and locality. Key issues identified through complaints are brought to the attention of higher level municipal leaders.

While no doubt the capacity and effectiveness of the system was exaggerated for the international participants at the conference, challenges and dilemmas were not only acknowledged but actively explored. One example was handling vexatious complainants and those who simply enjoy complaining and the attention that attracts.

A more serious challenge explored was the handling of disputes: where resolving one complainant’s concerns would be at the expense of others’ interests. For example, elderly residents in the upper floors of an old housing complex wanting a new lift which would adversely affect the amenity for those living on the ground floor. Resolution required a local official to engage with all those affected. Impressively, the frequency of complaints by residents in buildings without lifts led to a citywide program to work with communities to attach lifts to old five- and six-storey apartment blocks.

Broader implications

The context of this public complaints system is, of course, the absence of any democratic process. It is assumed that any differences of views or interests among Beijing’s residents can be resolved by Party officials, whether at the “street” level, district level or municipality level. And that performance management can ensure that Party officials are responsive to local community needs and preferences.

One doesn’t need to be a cynic to see that this elaborate system helps put a lid on opposition to the Party, thus protecting the current regime. The suspicious will also note the capacity of the technology to monitor citizens as well as government programs and performance.

And yet, in the absence of democratic institutions, “12345” does impose a form of “social accountability” on government in China. The term, “social accountability”, was first coined by one of the original leaders of our Dialogue network, Jun Ma, back in 2009 in an article in the Australian Journal of Public Administration (The Dilemma of Developing Financial Accountability without Election – A Study of China’s Recent Budget Reforms - Ma - 2009 - Australian Journal of Public Administration - Wiley Online Library). He suggested that, while China lacks democratic accountability processes, the government is still subject to other pressures from their citizens to be responsive. Ma is now a deputy mayor in Beijing and I was able to meet him at the conference. He emphasised that the new public complaints system is placing pressure on government to be responsive to citizens, and is feeding into and strengthening Beijing’s People’s Congress, Beijing’s legislature, thus also promoting more formal accountability in China.

Also apparent at the conference was the impressive extent of published research and international learning behind the complaints system, though the conference itself did not provide for extensive discussion or debate.

Separate workshops

While in Beijing I participated in two small workshops at Tsinghua and Renmin universities where issues about public administration developments under Xi Jinping were able to be explored openly along with comparisons with Australia. Participants included a number of my old Dialogue friends.

The picture which emerged was mixed: China’s approach is very different from Australia’s, not only in terms of our democratic governance but also in terms of the context of Australia being richer and having a more mature institutional framework. China is still developing, adjusting not only to international forces but also to domestic changes, both social and political.

It has so far rejected the Western approach of the “separation of powers” including the distinction between “politics” and “administration” within the executive arm of government. My Chinese colleagues suggested, however, that there may be “degrees of separation” and perhaps there is still room to establish some checks and balances, like the public complaints system. Improvements to public services are also continuing.

That said, the strong impression I gained was that major reform remains unlikely under Xi Jinping. Centralised political power is Xi’s priority and tight Party control under his leadership is continuing. Even administrative decentralisation is proving difficult: the budget and financial reforms of the 1990s have not been built upon and, despite repeated promises, revenue transfers to local government nowhere near match increased expenditure responsibilities leading to serious local government debt problems. Experimentation, long a strength in China’s earlier reforms, has become sporadic rather than systematic, used more for rhetorical PR purposes than for genuine evaluation to inform policy reform.

Indeed, academics are not allowed to publish research on the success or failure of China’s response to COVID-19.

Other observations

In my limited free time, I visited two of Beijing’s newer museums: the National Archaeological Museum and the Museum of the Chinese Communist Party. Both troubled me.

The Archaeological Museum, a huge building designed to look like a Han Dynasty drum, takes visitors from prehistoric times to Xi Jinping’s leadership. Exhibits cover every stage of China’s history but, amongst some worthy treasures, the coverage is mostly limited. Far better are Shanghai’s museum and the Shaanxi provincial museum in Xi’an. The troubling aspect was the final set of exhibits – a fascinating Russian movie of Chairman Mao’s 1949 celebration of the new republic in Shanghai that is followed by a room dedicated to Xi Jinping. Both have nothing to do with archaeology and simply celebrate the Party and Xi.

The CCP museum troubled me more. The exhibits are impressive and worth seeing, but the story told is one of continued Party success, including through every stage of CCP rule since 1949. Changes in direction are mentioned only obliquely, such as the “correction” under Deng Xiaoping’s opening up reforms, and there is no mention of any mistakes, let alone disasters. Before Xi Jinping, several museums I visited openly acknowledged the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Not now. Along with China’s Great Famine in the 1950s and Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Cultural Revolution has been removed from history.

It is clear that under Xi, China’s “socialist market economy” contradiction is much more about “socialism” than markets. Further opening up reforms that offer more freedom seem unlikely. More modest advances may provide room for the Chinese people to ensure government is more responsive to their needs, and for technological improvements in government services. At least there are signs of renewed willingness to allow a degree of open dialogue amongst academics including with international colleagues.

It’s still a complicated story.

Republished from The Mandarin, March 04, 2025