If Donald Trump has done nothing else, he should have convinced Australian strategic thinkers that the long-standing mantra of China-bad/America-good is no longer appropriate.

It is testimony to how deeply held such views are within Canberra’s policymaking elites, however, that even someone rated as the “worst president ever” by American political scientists is unlikely to change sentiment in this country.

Significantly, that survey was conducted before Trump returned to the White House. Everything that has happened over the last few weeks would only seem to confirm that judgment. To be fair, if he manages to stop the slaughter in Ukraine that really will be something, even if it is the result of publicly monstering the vulnerable leader of a democratic ally and doing deals with an authoritarian despot.

Rather daringly, the Albanese Government is flirting with the idea of being part of a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine, which could be read as a repudiation of American policy. This might mark one of the rare occasions since World War II that Australia was on the right side of history, unlike Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.

Displaying our fealty to our supposed protector has not done us any good either: not only did lots of young men not return from these entirely pointless and entirely avoidable conflicts, but they did not earn much political capital in Washington either. The threadbare nature of Australia’s supposed influence among American policymakers has been confirmed by the introduction of tariffs on Australian exports of steel and aluminium.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out. Don’t expect either of the major political parties to start striking attitudes in the way they did when China stopped Australian exports, though. On the contrary, Australia’s China hawks went into overdrive about the threat posed by the People’s Republic. By contrast, it is likely we will hear lots of talk about the durability of the alliance, the importance of working with any administration, and the threats posed by a volatile and uncertain region.

Maybe. It’s not beyond imagining that Trump may “solve” the crisis over Taiwan, too. It’s not impossible that he could judge it to be in America’s national interest to make a deal with Xi Jinping, because he “likes him very much”. True, his feelings for Xi don’t seem to have reached the same level that his “love letters” to Kim Jong-un revealed, but he clearly retains the sort of confidence in his ability to make things happen that so impresses senior conservatives in Australia.

It is not only Taiwan that may be subjected to unexpected threats to its security from an increasingly rogue and unpredictable Trump administration, though. Longstanding allies Japan and South Korea are also in Trump’s sights, something that threatens to overturn the entire strategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific region that is so fundamental to Australian security.

The point to emphasise is that it is the US, not China, that is taking a wrecking ball to the remarkable “Asian peace” that has been such a surprising and welcome part of the regional order for decades. Even formerly loyal allies like Singapore are rapidly rethinking what it means to be dependent on a country that puts “America first” in everything and uses its still remarkable power to bully others into agreement. In the words of Singapore’s defence minister, the US has changed from a “liberator to great disruptor to a landlord seeking rent”.

No such epiphany is likely to take place amongst Australia’s defence community, however. On the contrary, the likes of the Murdoch media and the US Studies Centres in Sydney and Perth continue to churn out reports and commentary that studiously ignore the changes that are convulsing the US, and which some serious and informed scholars think may end in authoritarian rule. Waiting out the Trump administration may not be an option if democracy dies or J.D. Vance takes over.

At some stage, policymakers and commentators may have to think the unthinkable: what happens if the US really does become the principal threat to the much invoked — but rarely seen of late — rules-based international order? What’s Plan B if the US completely gives up on its presumed role as the guarantor of democratic values, liberalism and international co-operation?

What if a transactionally-minded president simply decides there’s nothing to be gained by underwriting security in the Indo-Pacific, as some thoughtful and serious observers have long been warning? Even former members of the security establishment have questioned the wisdom of committing ourselves to technically and politically dubious defence agreements with an increasingly unreliable ally.

Whatever you think about the People’s Republic of China, at least we know where we stand with them and can make comparatively clear-eyed decisions in the fabled “national interest”. There’s something to be said for the line about “co-operating where we can and disagreeing where we must”. It’s past time that we started to apply the same sort of thinking and distance to relations with the US.

The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.