In the six months since US President Donald Trump’s re-election, the relentless assault on core democratic principles at home and international institutions and norms has turned the world upside down and inside out for the United States, its friends, allies and adversaries.

Canada has been on the frontline of key elements of the America First agenda, centred on multiple forms of tariffs and the darkly threatening intention to annex Canada as the 51st US state.

On the trade side, Ottawa has responded with a blend of concessions and targeted counter-tariffs, framing the situation as an economic war with enormous costs for both countries. Despite multi-tiered lobbying, Trump’s real intentions and strategy remain impossible to parse amidst almost daily zigzags.

Psychologically, Canadians have responded with a mix of emotions reborn from the era of “Manifest Destiny”. The feelings of abandonment, betrayal and loss of trust are palpable. The US has reneged on a signed treaty and suddenly moved from best — if imperfect — friend, to existential threat.

Politically, this has produced a dramatic surge of Canadian nationalism. This has included boycotts of American products, boos for the US national anthem at sporting events, cancelled travel plans and pro-Canada rallies.

In an election year, the fallout has been pivotal. Former prime minister Justin Trudeau resigned, the Liberal Party selected Mark Carney as its new leader and in less than 100 days has moved from 20 points behind Pierre Poilievre’s Conservative Party to a comfortable lead in the polls. The Economist recently rated the Liberals an 83% chance of winning on 28 April and a 73% chance of getting a majority.

Trump is the key factor in this shift, with the campaign focused on who can best stand up to him. Carney, a newcomer to political office and former governor of the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England, is seen by many Canadians as their best national champion. Poilievre, a career politician, whose initial lead was built on affordability issues including housing costs and taxes, has recently criticised Trump and promoted a “Canada First” approach intended to strengthen Canada in future negotiations with the US.

With a volatile national mood, a Liberal victory is likely, but not assured. Foreign policy issues rarely sway voters, but in this election, America First appears to be front of mind for most voters. Still missing from both parties’ platforms is the strategic question of Canada’s place in a dramatically altered international system.

Poilievre is hinting at an approach that can best be described as restorationist. It is premised on the hope that clever manoeuvring with Trump, closer alignment on defence spending and border protection and an eventual post-Trump normalcy can restore the integrated economy of the past.

The Carney approach appears to differ, focusing on reducing dependence on through diversification and partial decoupling, not bringing the economies closer together again, but managing their separation. As he stated in March, “the old relationship we had with the US, based on deepening integration of our economies and tight security and military co-operation, is over”.

A key assumption for Carney is that, while Trump may be a temporary pernicious presence, his policies are not. They reflect deeper, growing tendencies in a country no longer willing to underwrite a liberal global order that includes free trade, multiple alliances and inclusive multilateral institutions. Protectionism and coercive economic diplomacy are measures of US decline and are likely to stay.

Many believe radical diversification is the necessary response. Since 2017, Canada has signed 16 trade deals with European and Asian partners and it is in negotiations with many others. Beyond bilateral deals, Canada would reinforce regional arrangements like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and look for membership in others, while supporting radical reform of global institutions like the World Trade Organisation. The aim would be to strengthen a global trade architecture absent the United States. The US may have given up on free trade, but the world has not.

One likely consequence will be a reassessment of Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Trade diversification and deeper connections with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan,  Southeast Asia and India will remain priorities. But relations with China — described as a disruptor and a limited priority — will need to be revisited.

Considering the acidic public and media negativity about China, the Liberals have no interest in discussing it ahead of the election. But if victorious, realism about China’s global influence will demand an adjustment in rhetoric and policy. It is difficult to conceive of a radical diversification strategy that tries to work around or bracket both the US and China.

Whatever path Canadians eventually pursue will involve wrenching changes. The country  will be forced to either separate from, or restructure, a deeply integrated economy as well as intimately tied defence and security connections.

Canada has long aligned with the US on almost all major foreign policy issues, based on a largely common worldview and occasional arm twisting. But Trump’s America First policies and a collapsing rules-based order foretell that Canada is increasingly home alone with difficult choices ahead and the sad fact of a new adversary next door.

Republished from EASTASIAFORUM, 20 April