Less America. More Self-Reliance. More Asia. More Global Engagement.

Since the first Trump administration I have been arguing that these are the guiding principles best calculated to protect and advance Australia’s national interests in the conduct of our international relations. With Trump now back in the White House — more ill-informed, prejudiced, self-absorbed and dangerous than ever, and putting a co-operative rather than might-based multilateral system more at risk than ever — I believe it is now time to double down on those principles.

In any discussion of “national interests” my frame of reference has always been that for Australia, as everyone else, the term should embrace not only the obvious traditional duo of physical security and economic prosperity, but also our national interest in being, and being seen to be, a good international citizen, or putting it even more simply, a decent country: one not wholly consumed by immediate self-interest, but committed as well to our common humanity and the common good.

The point is that behaving decently — and this is particularly important in making the case for more global engagement — generates not just warm-inner-glows. It produces hard-headed national interest returns of the kind which should satisfy the most sceptical realist: above all, the kind of reputational return that makes a country one that others admire, trust, want to visit, study in, invest in and support in a crisis – what most of the world, if not Donald Trump, still understands as “soft power”.

As to ‘Less America’, this means recognising that the ANZUS alliance is manifestly now not what it was, if indeed it ever was. It has delivered us important technical, logistic and intelligence support in the past and hopefully will continue to do so, including through AUKUS Pillar II technical co-operation: I don’t advocate us initiating a severance. But whatever the psychological comfort it might also have offered us in days gone by, the reality is that ANZUS has never bound the US to defend us, even in the event of existential attack. Washington will, no doubt, shake a deterrent fist, and threaten and deliver retaliation, if its own assets on Australian soil are threatened or attacked, but that’s as far as our expectations should extend.

All that AUKUS and its associated new alliance commitments have done for Australia’s defence is paint more targets on our back. Not only Pine Gap, which has always been the case, but now Perth with the Stirling base, Northern Australia with the Marine and B-52 bases in Darwin and Tindal, and a possible future east coast submarine base as well. The crazy irony is that we are spending an eye-watering amount to build new capability to meet military threats which are most likely to arise simply because we have that capability and are using it to assist the United States.

As to "More Self-Reliance", I am among those who believe that the “Red Alert” China threat to our security has been wildly overstated, and that outright invasion — as distinct from grey-zone operations, blockade attempts and hit and run attacks on particular facilities — is almost inconceivable. But I totally accept that defence planning always has to be based on worst case assumptions, taking into account potential adversaries’ capabilities, not just known or likely intent. And in that context we are going to have to get used to doing more, spending significantly more, and prioritising that expenditure more wisely.

Bearing in mind that geographical distance is our greatest asset, with Beijing closer to London than Sydney, I support what Sam Roggeveen calls the “echidna strategy… spiky but unthreatening”. This would focus on making our adjacent seas and skies unsafe to the point of impenetrability for any opposing force, through a combination of air, underwater, missile and cyber detection and destruction capabilities, with significant reliance on autonomous delivery systems.

As to “More Asia”, to me this means three main things. First, strengthening regional trade and economic relationships, and the capacity to push back collectively against Trump’s trade warfare.

Second, strengthening political and, where possible, military relationships with key regional neighbours like India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea, on both a bilateral and mini-lateral basis. Partly to concentrate China’s mind on the reality that overreach will not be without pushback. But also to maximise collective regional diplomatic pressure on both China and the US to reach mutually accommodating detente, rather than engage in a confrontational struggle for primacy, with all the risk that entails of ending in tears, and which nobody in our region wants.

Third, “More Asia” also means for me Australia trying to develop with China itself not just a one -dimensional economic relationship, but a more multidimensional one, particularly in the multilateral sphere where Beijing has in recent times been playing a more interested and constructive role than has generally been recognised, certainly more than Trump’s Washington. Australia should be actively exploring the scope for co-operation in a whole range of global and regional public goods issues – from climate change to nuclear arms control, terrorism to health pandemics, peace-keeping to responding to mass atrocity crimes, and defending free trade.

As to “More Global Engagement”, with Trump taking a wrecking ball to critical multilateral institutions like the WHO, WTO, ICC and, increasingly, the UN itself, it has never been more important for countries who can make a difference — and Australia is one of them — to rally in their support. Our value-add here is essentially middle power diplomacy, the crucial tool of which is international coalition building in support of global and regional public goods.

Australia has been at its best, and our standing in the world highest, when we play to our national strengths as a capable, credible middle power working with others of similar stature (not just familiar suspects like Canada and the Nordics, but key players in our own region like Indonesia); when we work through the UN and other international institutions; and when we project ourselves effectively on to the international stage as what I have described as a good international citizen.

In an increasingly might-is-right world, where the US has abandoned all pretence at decency, and illiberal authoritarianism seems to be on a roll, I continue to believe — I hope not impossibly naively — that the best course for Australia to chart is not to succumb to any temptation to follow suit, but to stand tall in support of a decent international order, and work our tail off diplomatically to find like-minded others who share that commitment, and have the energy and stamina to stay the course until the wheel turns.

As always, in international relations as in life itself, it is important to stay optimistic. If we cease to believe in the possibility of a safer, saner and better world, and the utility of working for it, we are never going to inhabit one.

*Panel Presentation to Sovereignty and Security Forum, National Press Club, Canberra, 31 March