The Coalition's climate change wars: Costs and opportunities
The Coalition's climate change wars: Costs and opportunities
Jeremy Webb

The Coalition's climate change wars: Costs and opportunities

There should be no surprise that the Nationals’ climate change denial-infected policy preferences have led to a rupture of the Coalition.

They would have been an unwearable millstone around the Liberals’ neck – none more so that their obdurate embrace of nuclear power, ironically a policy so transparently invented to keep the Coalition together. It was a policy which the Teals took such great delight in tying the Liberals to, given its rejection — or wilful ignoring of — scientific facts and rigorous analysis. Which is to say, its modelling was based on palpably absurd assumptions leading to demonstrably false claims that it would reduce the price of power or effect a timely lowering of emissions.

Post-election, the Coalition’s defeat means the nuclear power option is even more effectively time-framed out of contention. While that may suit the Liberals, by discarding it they are left with the differentiating option of backing the extended use of coal and gas – but which, ultimately, will not deliver 2050 carbon neutrality.

The nuclear option was by no means the only problem facing the Liberals in coalition. Their lack of electoral support from women is linked to their climate change policies. Recent surveys show Australia women are markedly more favourable to action on climate change: only 29% believe the seriousness of climate change is exaggerated while 42% of men do. Fewer women support repealing carbon laws (26% vs 42% of men) and are less likely to think carbon pricing hurts the economy.

For the Nationals, farmers — a natural choice for their power base — are arguably the economy’s most affected by climate change and will be more so in the future. But their interests have been discarded by the Nationals and largely supplanted by the mining industry. The Nationals are, therefore, allied to their corporate backers in opposing a rapid transition to renewables and avoiding stranding the industry’s carbon assets.

But justifying a slowing of the transition poses problems for the Liberals given the role of renewables in lowering power prices is being backed by an increasing flow of scientific findings readily digested by urban voters. The Australian Energy Market Operator has calculated that by early last year, wholesale electricity prices on Australia’s east coast had decreased by 8% over 2023 – primarily due to the growing share of renewable energy in the grid (then 39% and now 43%). The market is clearly backing the falling cost curves of renewables with a mountain of investment in the pipeline. This fact has not escaped the chief executive of the Australian Industry Group, Innes Willox, who has lent his support for Australia’s transition to renewable energy. In short, the Liberals are having to come to terms with the fact that the rapid greening of Australia’s electricity grid is now locked in and that their thumping electoral defeat signals no possibility of a retreat from this path.

In such a uniquely favourable political environment likely to last over the next — and probable second — term, an unwedged Labor government is finally in a position to spend a good deal of political capital on reworking its climate change policies which, a growing number of economists believe, will not deliver carbon neutrality by 2050. But so far, Albanese’s forward looking “bold” agenda (SMH, 10 May) is to be wrapped around a strange Trumpian worded theme of “progressive patriotism” designed to build his legacy around housing, Medicare and childcare reforms.

Such caution, if enduring, does not sit well with needed reforms to accelerate the overall reduction of carbon emissions and particularly industrial emissions. Labor’s attachment to the safeguards mechanism means a rejection of policies which more directly reduce industrial emissions. Rather, there is a reliance on the fundamentally flawed devices of carbon capture and storage and carbon offsets (of the latter, there are global estimates indicating 80% are nonviable). There are also those — and particularly the Greens — who are demanding Labor engineer policies to deal with Australia’s scope 3 emissions (created by the burning of our coal and gas exports) and which account for some 57 billion tonnes of CO2 annually or 2% of global emissions. They are set to keep growing in the face of Labor’s sanctioned expansion of coal and gas mining, with more than 30 being approved in its last term in office with a further 80 awaiting (including extension of the massive North West shelf gas project).

Most economists acknowledge that a return to a carbon tax (abolished by Tony Abbott in 2014) is, by far, the fairest and the only efficient way of reducing carbon emissions and, indeed, essential if we are to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Ross Garnaut calculates that if a broad-based $90 per ton carbon tax (similar to that of the EU) was imposed in 2030, it could raise about 2% of GDP – some $60 billion. As an alternative, Garnaut and Rod Sims are promoting a far more ambitious scheme where a targeted carbon tax would be applied to the more than 100 companies which extract fossil fuels and to all fossil fuel imports (to avoid doubling up, the tax would not be applied to fossil fuel exports to countries which had similar taxes). They estimate, at current EU rates, the tax could raise about $100 billion annually.

Importantly, it is envisaged the tax would become part of a global trend in the adoption of carbon border adjustment mechanisms (effectively a carbon-based import tariff) – and which are in the process of being applied to a range of products by the EU. Globally, such a scheme would act to accelerate the move away from carbon fuels and thus reduce scope 3 emissions. For Australia, Garnaut and Sims see the revenue derived being used to fund low carbon manufacturing, renewable expansion and cost of living relief.

Of course, a carbon tax may well take more courage than Labor has in store. An alternative policy route (picking up from the Coalition’s gas reserve proposal) would be a new levy on gas exports – and specifically on the 50% of gas currently exported and inexplicably not subject to royalties. It is argued that with a looming global oversupply of gas, Australia needs to derive maximum revenue from its existing output to fund its energy transition and accept an inevitable decline in investment in new capacity. Such a levy could bring in more than $13 billion annually – even at the currently miserly average levy of between 2% and 5%. If it were to be increased close to the global average of 10-15%, that would produce about $50 billion – sufficient perhaps to fund a lowering of emissions and still contribute to the realisation of progressive patriotism policies.

But as a prudent precursor, the Albanese Government would need to greatly expand public knowledge and acceptance of the science and economic benefits underpinning such bold policies. That is badly needed in an era of misleading social (and Murdoch-derived) media which is feeding the 15-20% of Australian who are not convinced that climate change is human induced. A non-controversial modest start could be to include climate change in the national education curriculum.

 

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.

Jeremy Webb