In Jakarta for his first overseas visit after the election, the prime minister was displaying his elevated obfuscation skills.

Carefully honed during the election campaign, Anthony Albanese ducked questions from journalists about whether the Russians had asked Indonesia to base long-range bombers in West Papua. By avoiding a direct response, the Russia “threat” stalks the prime minister.

“The Russians are coming” is a panicked refrain heard throughout much of Australia’s history since European settlement. Former prime minister Malcolm Fraser was particularly exercised by Russia’s presence in the Indian Ocean during his time in office. At times in the 1960s and ’70s, it was overshadowed by the Indonesian Threat. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been replaced by the China Threat.

Fort Denison in the middle of Sydney Harbour is a reminder of the 19th-century Russian phobia that once gripped the colonies. So is the half-buried cannon on the western heads at Queenscliff overlooking the entrance to Port Phillip Bay. Port Fairy in Victoria has a never-used 19th-century cannon battery, as does Newcastle in NSW.

The recent  Russian threat alarm during the election campaign was as bizarre as the reaction was predictable. The breathless headlines briefly stirred the election campaign out of its torpor.

The Coalition always hankers after a national security “crisis” and the Labor Party had learned its lesson never to be wedged on national security. In the immediate frisson, the minister for defence was like a rabbit caught in the headlights and the prime minister was helped by an over-enthusiastic Peter Dutton verballing the Indonesian president, for which he subsequently apologised.

At no time did any of our national leaders consider how preposterous was the suggestion that Indonesia would ever permit Russia to do this. First, Indonesia is one of the founders in the 1950s of the non-aligned movement and hosted its first meeting in Bandung. To this day, non-alignment is a cornerstone of its foreign policy, a sacred writ.

Second, Indonesia remains a deeply committed member of ASEAN. ASEAN generally seeks to hold great powers at arm’s length from the region. The exception here is Manila which permits US bases on its territory. But the Philippines’ experience of decolonisation from the US is vastly different than that of Indonesians from the Dutch.

The Russians may have asked the question of Jakarta, but would have known the answer would be “no”. Albanese subsequently suggested that the Russians were just “trouble making”. In what way, he did not say. But it might have been a much-delayed gesture to the basing of US long-range bombers at Tindall in the Northern Territory.

What I termed the “Chussia anxiety” in my recent book,  _Great Game On_, was clearly on display. Several commentators were quick to pull the trigger on this being part of a China and Russia play to corner the region.

That Russia was acting in co-ordination with China was simply presented as a self-evident truth. While China and Russia do share a common sour attitude to the US-led West, although perhaps Putin less so these days now Trump is in the White House, a great deal divides them and they do not have a military alliance, pact, undertaking or any other such agreement. They do conduct joint military exercises in East Asia, but so do many other countries.

In fact, what was ultimately a ham-fisted inquiry by Russia, if it indeed occurred at all, may have been more about Russia showing China that it had friends and influence in Southeast Asia and wider options in the region than just China.

Since it was first uttered in Beijing in February 2022, on the eve of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the “friendship without limits” has not been heard of again. It was not uttered during Xi’s visit to Moscow for the May victory celebration parades just held, attended by 29 other foreign leaders.

Since Putin’s failed invasion, the massive loss of blood and treasure and the damage caused to Russia’s prestige and military standing have seen Moscow becoming more and more dependent on Beijing. Russia’s weight in Central Asia has declined relative to China, as has its influence globally. It is not uncommon to hear of Russia being described as China’s vassal, causing Moscow’s elites to bristle.

Putin has regularly sought to remind Beijing that his pivot to the east extends beyond Beijing. Moscow and New Delhi’s relationship is particularly close. When Modi was re-elected as prime minister of India, his first official visit was to a beaming Putin in the Kremlin. The India-China relationship is barely cordial.

When Putin was re-elected in May last year, his first official visit was to Beijing. It could hardly have been otherwise. But it was a lacklustre affair with no major announcement and no progress on the much-delayed Power of Siberia Two gas pipeline. Moscow regards this as critically important, especially under the pressure of the West’s Ukraine sanctions regime.

Significantly, Putin quickly followed the visit to Beijing with visits to Pyongyang and Hanoi, with both of whom Beijing has complex and difficult relations. A few months later came the startling announcement that some 10,000-12,000 North Korean troops would be sent to fight alongside Russian troops in Ukraine. On a recent visit to Beijing, I was told by Chinese officials that Kim Jong-un was sending a message that North Korea had a closer and more important friend than China.

Russia may also be sending a similar message to Beijing, as was seen with the effusive reception afforded by Putin to Kim Jong-un when last year he visited an armaments factory in the Russian Far East.

China’s existential fear with North Korea is that in return for desperately needed, but relatively low-tech arms, such as cannon shells, Putin may be tempted to supply more advanced military technology to Pyongyang. This, in turn, may encourage North Korean adventurism against the South. Putin, for his part, may have an interest in encouraging this as a diversion from his stalemate in Ukraine.

Chinese strategic planners remember only too well how Kim’s grandfather’s invasion of the South was encouraged by Moscow, but the Russians left it to China to be drawn in to defend the DPRK, at great loss of Chinese lives, with promises of troops and aid which never arrived. The commitment of troops to the Korean War also deprived Mao of his first and last chance to launch the large-scale invasion of Taiwan for which he had been preparing.

In the 1960s, US official policy was blinded by ideology and refused to acknowledge the reality of the Sino-Soviet split. The United States’ (and Australia’s) costly military intervention in Vietnam may not have occurred if this was correctly understood at the time. It is also worth recalling that China’s last two major military conflicts were with its fraternal communist neighbours: the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

During the election, the prime minister did well to point out that China was Australia’s largest trading partner. And when the “flotilla” of just three Chinese navy vessels sailed through the Tasman Sea, that we also sail through the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits. He could save himself some awkward questions by reminding Australia that Indonesia was one of the founders of the non-aligned movement.

Republished from the Australian Financial Review, 16 May 2025