South Korea’s gender divide has become a flashpoint in its democratic evolution. Amid economic stagnation and rising disillusionment, young men increasingly view feminist policies as threats to fairness, fuelling anti-feminist populism. Yet the roots of this divide run deeper — into the Confucian familism embedded in welfare structures, selective workplace norms, and a military culture that reinforces hegemonic masculinity. While women face structural inequalities, young men confront shifting expectations that clash with traditional roles.

For a generation nurtured on aspirations of prosperity and upward mobility, the stark realities of stagnant wages, soaring living costs and limited career prospects have engendered a profound sense of disillusionment among today’s South Korean youth.

This cohort has been labelled the ‘N-po generation’, a term denoting the relinquishment of numerous traditional life milestones. Initially coined as the three giving-up generation (sampo sedae) — referring to the abandonment of dating, marriage and childbearing — the idea has evolved to encompass additional sacrifices. These include home ownership, stable employment, personal relationships, health, physical appearance and even life aspirations.

While societal challenges affect all young people in South Korea, young men often feel these pressures more acutely. Hegemonic masculinity has historically positioned men as the primary breadwinners and protectors of the family.

Neoliberal self-development, which is linked to the ideology of individualism and self-reliance, intensifies competition and pressures men to live up to traditional masculine standards of success in an increasingly cutthroat environment. Amid this frustration, government agencies like the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) — designed to advance women’s rights and gender equality — are seen by some younger men as introducing unfair advantages for women. Efforts to address gender imbalances can provoke feelings of victimisation among men, who view these policies as preferential treatment that disregards their struggles.

Gendered disillusionment in South Korea reached its peak during the 2022 presidential election, where former president Yoon Suk-yeol’s conservative campaign capitalised on male grievances, reframing the Moon Jae-In administration’s feminist policies as discriminatory against men. Yoon’s rhetoric, which included pledges to abolish the MOGEF and portray feminism as a threat to fairness, resonated with many men who embraced neoliberal meritocracy.

This rhetoric transformed their economic frustrations into a gendered conflict, positioning women’s empowerment as a zero-sum threat to male opportunity. The results were stark as 58.7 per cent of young men voted for Yoon, while his opponent Lee Jae-myung, garnered 58 per cent of the young female vote. This shift represented a departure from traditional voting patterns, where younger voters tended to favour progressive candidates, underscoring the rise of gender populism in South Korea.

Despite South Korea’s rapid economic development and profound social transformation over recent decades, the family-centred welfare model — deeply rooted in Confucian familism — continues to exert a strong influence on societal structures.

Emphasising familial responsibility and intergenerational support, this model has significantly shaped welfare policy, often prioritising private family obligations over public institutional intervention. By formalising Confucian principles in policy, the state effectively delegates core societal functions — such as healthcare, education and emotional care — to families, thereby privatising responsibilities typically borne by the state.

While this model is culturally valorised, it simultaneously entrenches gendered divisions of labour and reinforces workplace inequalities. The very cultural reverence that legitimises Confucian familism also obstructs reform, embedding these inequities within moral and historical narratives that resist critique, even as modernisation necessitates systemic change.

In the context of employmentt, since South Korea’s democratisation in the late 20th century, successive governments have implemented feminist policies to encourage female labour participation. The establishment of the MOGEF in 2001 under president Kim Dae-jung’s administration marked a significant institutional commitment to gender equity.

Yet the timing and framing of that initiative suggest that it was instrumentalised as part of economic policy rather than pursued as a transformative societal goal. This is because the push for women’s employment emerged primarily in response to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which exposed structural weaknesses in South Korea’s male-centred labour market and highlighted the economic necessity of mobilising women as an untapped labour resource.

While more women have since moved beyond the confines of the private sphere into the public sphere, this shift has not been matched by a transformation in social expectations or institutional support. Women continue to face significant gender disparities in both economic and political representation.

In 2022, the country recorded the OECD’s largest gender pay gap at 31.2 per cent, with women earning nearly a third less than men. Despite women’s higher tertiary education enrolment — 76.6 per cent of women versus 70.3 per cent of men in 2023 — they held only 22.1 per cent of managerial positions across industries. Political representation remains similarly imbalanced, with women occupying just 20 per cent of seats in the National Assembly as of April 2025.

While various factors contribute to these disparities, one of the most prominent is the rigid gender roles upheld by institutionalised familism. Institutionalised familism is a societal structure where family-based responsibilities, such as caregiving and household duties, are not only expected within the private sphere but are also ingrained in public policies, workplace norms and social expectations.

With minimal public support for childcare or eldercare, caregiving remains privatised as a woman’s duty, forcing many to juggle paid employment with unpaid domestic labour. Societal norms around caregiving lead to selective hiring practices and slower promotion rates for women, as employers often view female candidates as less reliable for demanding roles. This perception stems from the assumption that men, unencumbered by caregiving duties, can offer longer, uninterrupted work cycles.

Another layer to the issue of selective hiring lies in the paradox surrounding mandatory military service for men. While men are required to serve 18–21 months, this hiatus is rarely penalised professionally in the same way that caregiving-related career gaps are for women. Culturally, military service is often framed as a formative experience that fosters discipline, loyalty and resilience — qualities employers may value.

Yet, many young men view this obligation as a career setback, especially in a hyper-competitive job market where women, exempt from service, continue advancing their education or early careers. These frustrations have been politicised, with gender populists citing mandatory military service as evidence of systemic bias against men. Ironically, this backlash is perpetuated by the very institution that amplifies male grievance—the military’s reinforcement of hegemonic masculinity.

The rise of anti-feminism in South Korea is not merely a reaction to gender equality policies but stems from the clash between entrenched gender norms and evolving socioeconomic realities. Many young men perceive increased competition with women for jobs and resources, leading to feelings of displacement and insecurity. This perception is exacerbated by the belief that gender equality has been achieved, with women now gaining more opportunities.

Efforts to highlight ongoing disparities, such as the gender pay gap and women’s dual burden, often fail to bridge the divide. Younger men, who may not experience these barriers directly, are often prone to downplaying gender inequality, making it difficult to shift their perception. This inclination often arises from an unconscious adherence to maintaining their sense of identity within a framework that has long been centred around hegemonic masculinity and male privilege. Troublingly, this defensive posture is exploited by populist rhetoric, which weaponises anxieties around shifting gender roles and frames gender policies through a zero-sum lens.

In South Korea, populism thrives on gender polarisation and economic precarity but gains traction partly because institutional responses lag behind societal shifts. While populism is a recurring feature in democracies, it is not inevitable. Countering its rise demands equitable governance, institutional accountability and a commitment to solidarity.

Crucially, the strength of a democracy lies not in the absence of conflict but in its ability to manage it inclusively and constructively. South Korea’s democratic resilience will, therefore, depend on its willingness to address the root causes of populist unrest, particularly gendered inequities and identity politics.

South Korea’s turmoil reflects the growing pains of a region caught between tradition and modernity. Its path forward — whether towards polarisation or pluralism — will signal to East Asia whether traditional family-centric models can adapt to uphold both cultural identity and the demands of neoliberal modernisation.

Republished from EastAsia Forum, 23 July 2025

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.