China policy and related diplomacy has recently made important progress based on the postponed resolution of apparently hard differences, but how long can the “reservation” of difficulty delay the explicit correction of the separation of economy and security?

On the right, politicians and mainstream media whinge about Albanese’s apparently wicked reference to Gough Whitlam’s correct decision to recognise China. Subsequent trade with China obviously had a tremendously positive impact on Australia’s economy; however, former Speaker, Bronwyn Bishop, focused attention on Prime Minister Albanese as a “ventriloquist dummy for President Xi”. This is to confuse weakness with strength. Such antic comment is so silly that it lends itself to question who is the real dummy in the room. The alarmist right-wing commentariat misappropriates national self-determination and typically cries wolf and trades in absolutes. As long as it fails to recognise the failure of Morrison’s bankrupt China policy it will not be able to progress policy. It is unable to appreciate nuanced dialectical thinking about war and peace. Bluster is not policy. If Albanese deserves accolades, not brickbats, there is still much to consider. To borrow from the “holistic” approach of the Club of Rome (est. April, 1968, at the Academia del Lincei) security and economy are intimately connected and cannot for long be placed in separate silos. China policy and related diplomacy has recently made important progress based on the postponed resolution of apparently hard differences, but how long can the “reservation” of difficulty delay the explicit correction of the separation of economy and security?

To begin with, it would be appropriate to acknowledge the truly gratifying rational progression in Australia’s China policy. As a newly minted foreign minister Penny Wong first drew attention in her 2022 Whitlam Oration to “Cooperation where we can, disagree where we must”. Complimentary to this new China initiative, there was a contemporaneous approach to the Pacific nations, stressing that Australia would act as a “partner” rather than a “patriarch” within the Pacific “family”. Albanese has taken the lead to consolidate enhanced engagement, based on equality and mutual respect. Australia and China now agree on the importance of the national self-determination of states.

During his visit to the Great Wall, Albanese praised Gough Whitlam China’s initiative policy supporting Australia’s real national interest. The adoption of “cooperate where we can, disagree where we must” is in increasingly congenial symmetry with the key Chinese operational principle, “seek common ground, while reserving differences”. For a very long time China has formally applied such reasoning to relations between states with different constitutional and value systems across the developed and developing world. The noisy commentariat, however, seldom stops to identify, let alone explain the contents of a Chinese construct. Such oversight reflects language difficulties, but also gratuitous assumption dismissing whatever the Chinese have to say as insidious deception.

“Seeking common ground, while reserving differences” originated in a rational iteration of Chinese dialectics that approximate the Hegelian “unity and clash of opposites”. As the architect of modern foreign policy Premier Zhou Enlai introduced “seeking common ground, while reserving differences” during the Bandung and Geneva Conferences of 1954-55. Zhou clarified that China, while adhering to its own values, would not be telling others how to govern themselves. To this day, China’s leaders have likewise rejected “hegemony of system”. Zhou’s diplomacy challenged strongly held ideological convictions to highlight mutual respect between equal self-determining nation-states. His calm approach likened states to people. He affirmed that “human nature differs just as human faces differ” and that this equally applied to countries and peoples. His diplomacy subsequently enjoyed spectacular successes including the widespread recognition of the PRC and its acquisition, in the face of American hostility, of the China seats at the UN. At the same time, and in the middle of the war in Vietnam, Sino-US normalisation built on the logic of the five principles of peaceful coexistence as operationalised through “seeking common ground while reserving differences”. Both China and the US freely stated differences in the first Shanghai Communique. This application even applied to differences over Taiwan issue which was “reserved” to an unfortunate extent.

“Seeking and reserving” later served at the core of Deng Xiaoping’s international policy on modernisation synthesising China’s “self-reliance” with the “open door”. As early as January 29, 1963, Deng’s mentor in the dialectics of pragmatism, Zhou Enlai adopted “seeking common ground while reserving differences” (qiu tong zun yi) to facilitate China’s overall development strategy. Zhou explained to a Shanghai conference, “…we can draw on [the developed countries] advanced experience and make use of their latest scientific and technological achievements. By doing so we shall broaden our horizons… . We…must catch up with the developed countries. But we don’t have to follow on the heels of others at every step.” The stress on China mainly relying on its own efforts while simultaneously opening its door to foreign science and technology did not reassure implacable Cold War critics who had insisted that once China reached a certain stage of development it would openly seek external plunder and world dominance. China did not invent globalisation. America did.

Applying the policy, “self-reliance and the open door” (zili gengsheng kaifang zhengce) China wisely accepted the benefits of globalisation while guarding against its excesses. Once China’s qualified globalisation yielded extraordinarily positive economic success, American globalisation quickly became an American liability, or a zero-sum exercise rather than a benefit.

In Beijing Albanese pressed the re-start button. As the leader of a trading nation Albanese dismissed the commentariat’s bitter condemnation and laudably adopted a calm and consistent approach. The latter recommends mutual respect that deals maturely with recognised ideological and value differences while valuing the importance of Australia’s own economic development and national interest.

Even with this initiative the future is fraught with danger. There will always be complications. The Chinese have an expression for just about anything hence “pointed tall things are easily broken, and glistening white things are easily soiled” (Yaoyao zhe yi zhe; jiaojiao zhe yi wu). Even within Albanese’s strategic initiative, the Morrison Doctrine, justifying an “arc of alliances” to contain China, still enjoys a toxic half-life that adversely affects Sino-Australian relations.

As Albanese references Whitlam, Xi references Zhou Enlai. However, at the highest level of strategic thinking, there is a “problematique” that lacks a satisfactory “resolutique”. A separate silo approach may borrow time to deal with immediate difficulties, but is it good enough to protect and enhance specific areas of trade while militarily containing one’s best trading partner? Continued “reservation” may advance renewed “strategic ambiguity” to help resolve the Taiwan Question. On the other hand, sceptics may see this cautious rationality as forever kicking the can down the road. Discrete issues in time may resolve themselves over time, but, over the long term, policy cannot place economy and trade in a separate silo from security. To the right, Albanese is fiercely verballed for going too far, but, on the left, there is too little comment on the necessity of a timely move forward with an “holistic” approach that closely integrates economic and security concerns.

Continuing commitment to AUKUS and the “northward strategy” to contain the “China Threat” is not likely to guarantee either Australia’s future economy, or its security.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.