Since the end of the Cold War, the world has become complacent about the danger of nuclear war.

While the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons has held so far, the nuclear-armed countries have ignored their moral and legal obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. They are also ignoring the importance of arms control for their own security.

Most of the agreements between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia limiting nuclear weapons are defunct or expiring. The New START Treaty — the last major bilateral arms control agreement — will lapse in February 2026, leaving the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals without verifiable limits. President Putin has proposed maintaining the New START limits informally for a year, and possibly resuming arms control dialogue between the two countries. And President Trump has declared his interest in “denuclearisation”. Both should be encouraged to revive the art of the nuclear deal.

Meanwhile, China’s rapid nuclear expansion and rising regional tensions in South Asia and elsewhere mean the epicentre of nuclear risk has shifted from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific (including the Indo-Pacific).

The current situation demands a new, more inclusive approach. Traditional bilateral arms control models can no longer meet the scale and complexity of today’s challenges; what is needed is broader regional engagement. The Asia-Pacific itself must take a lead.

Nuclear arms control framework

The overarching objectives of arms control are to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to establish the conditions under which nuclear disarmament can be achieved. These objectives are given effect through treaties and other agreements, supported by practical arrangements and measures.

The principal treaty underpinning global efforts to control nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT recognises five nuclear-weapon states (US, Russia, UK, France and China). There are four nuclear-armed countries outside the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Virtually all the world’s non-nuclear-armed countries are parties to the NPT and commit not to acquire nuclear weapons. The five nuclear-weapon states commit to end the arms race and pursue disarmament.

The other major global treaty is the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Although this treaty has not formally entered into force, the CTBT’s international monitoring system is in operation. It is not clear whether Trump’s recent announcement on resuming “nuclear tests” means explosive tests, contrary to the CTBT, or missile tests.

Also important are the treaties establishing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. These are in Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa and Central Asia. In addition, Mongolia is a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Arms control involves a range of approaches and methods. Key elements, sometimes described as “the four D’s”, are:

• Doctrine – clarifying the circumstances in which nuclear weapons might be used. A key objective here is commitment to “no first use”, or “sole purpose” – that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter their use by others;
• Deployment – drastically reducing the number of nuclear weapons ready for immediate use;
• De-alerting – taking nuclear weapons off high-alert, launch-on-warning readiness; and
• Decreased numbers – substantially reducing national arsenals.

Other essential measures include effective communications among the nuclear-armed countries — including emergency hotlines and ongoing dialogue — and transparency, confidence-building and verification arrangements.

Developing these agreements and measures will require a return to diplomacy in place of the political hyperbole that is all too common today.

While it is primarily for the nuclear-armed countries themselves to negotiate arms control arrangements, in view of the global threat posed by nuclear weapons the rest of the international community has a compelling interest in ensuring real progress in this area. Many countries have expertise they can contribute, and many are in defence relationships with a nuclear-armed country, so are in a position to exercise influence and encouragement on the key parties.

The Asia-Pacific dimension

Eight of the current nine nuclear-armed countries have strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific. In addition, several countries in the region are covered by extended nuclear deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) arrangements.

While it is vital that the US and Russia extend bilateral restraint arrangements, negotiations now must also engage China and the other nuclear-armed countries. China needs to be assured that arms control involves much more than numeric limits – there is a range of risk reduction steps that would be very much in China’s interest. India and Pakistan would benefit from bilateral risk reduction measures. And efforts have to be revived to curb nuclear threats on the Korean Peninsula.

Who could step up?

Leadership is needed to advance the nuclear arms control agenda in the Asia-Pacific. China, as the emerging regional nuclear giant, has most to gain from risk reduction steps, and its no-first-use policy offers a foundation for dialogue, but China is currently reluctant to engage. Non-nuclear-weapon countries that could develop a partnership to help take these issues forward include: Indonesia, with its strong non-aligned credentials; South Korea, which has a vital interest in this subject due to its neighbours; and Japan and Australia, long advocates of nuclear restraint (the 2009 report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, convened by Japan and Australia, remains a landmark study in this area). Recent political change in several key countries in the region suggest the time might be right for such an initiative.

Initially, regional forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit could provide platforms for this cooperation, bridging official and non-official channels.

Lessons can be learned from the Euro-Atlantic legacy, including the confidence building measures of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, but new thinking is vital and should be encouraged through official contacts and also through non-governmental networks such as those supported by the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, the Toda Peace Institute and the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.

With the 2026 NPT Review Conference approaching and global arms control at risk of collapse, there is an urgent need to reinvigorate and expand arms control efforts. Our region has potential champions of sufficient global weight to stem the drift towards nuclear catastrophe, but will they accept the challenge? Previous Labor governments made nuclear risk reduction and arms control a foreign policy priority, it must be hoped the current government will follow suit.

This article is condensed from a policy brief originally published by the Toda Peace Institute and available here.

The views expressed in this article may or may not reflect those of Pearls and Irritations.