On 7 August, the Constitutional Court of Thailand dissolved the Move Forward Party on the basis of its attempts to amend the country’s lese majeste law, banning its executives from politics for a decade. Following the party’s dissolution, its members merged into the Thinkakhao Chaovilai Party and retitled it the People’s Party. Just a week later, prime minister Srettha Thavisin was dismissed by the same court after an ethics probe that was widely believed to have been politically motivated. The decisions mark the return of autocratic politics, led by the country’s royalist-military political establishment, and have extinguished optimism that Thailand might see a return to democracy.
On 7 August, the Constitutional Court of Thailand dissolved the Move Forward Party and banned its executives from politics for 10 years. A week later, prime minister Srettha Thavisin was dismissed. These episodes marked the return of autocratic politics after a brief period of democratisation.
The 2023 Thai elections were supposed to restore hopes of democracy after nearly a decade of military-led rule following the 2014 coup. The forced dissolution of a major party, the removal of a sitting prime minister and another looming cabinet reshuffle have extinguished optimism that Thailand could return to a democratic path, or at least achieve some sort of political stability.
The court ruling was handed down to the country’s most popular party on the basis that it sought to amend the country’s lese majeste (offence to majesty) law. Critics have long argued that the law has been used to silence and punish political opposition rather than to protect the monarchical institution. While the ruling was widely expected, the court’s decision to eliminate the largest political bloc in the Thai parliament was a devastating blow to democracy.
This follows a familiar pattern. Just a few years prior, the MFP’s predecessor, the Future Forward Party, succumbed to the same fate. The Future Forward Party rose quickly in prominence, becoming the third most popular party in the 2019 elections a year after its founding. The party’s anti-establishment policies and branding captured the hearts and minds of young and progressive Thais who embraced the prospect of a more equal, open and inclusive Thailand and saw the Future Forward Party as a conduit for structural change.
Thailand’s political conservatives saw the new party as a major threat to the status quo, wherein the military and the monarchy maintain prominence, and mounted a “judicial coup” to dissolve the party. The MFP — a more radical and popular successor — represented an even bigger threat to the power of these political conservatives.
The irony of the MFP’s downfall was that it occurred under the leadership of the ruling Pheu Thai Party, its former ally, whose predecessors had also suffered the same fate. Following the 2006 coup, which dislodged one of Thailand’s most popular prime ministers, Thaksin Shinawatra, his party Thai Rak Thai and its successor Palang Prachachon were also dissolved.
Pheu Thai, having ditched the MFP to form a coalition with conservative parties, then saw to it that the MFP would cease to exist. The MFP became Pheu Thai’s biggest rival after Pheu Thai unexpectedly came second to the MFP in the 2023 elections. The ruling party’s leadership figures blamed its loss of popularity on the party’s poor use of social media and diminished brand appeal. Pheu Thai’s survival in the electoral arena would depend on weakening the MFP’s support base.
The MFP, now transformed into the People’s Party, managed to retain all 143 of its members of parliament under the new party banner – a feat the Future Forward Party failed to achieve. The party’s dissolution infuriated Thais beyond its support base and angered some of the country’s closest allies. The real test for the People’s Party will be harnessing voter frustration and redirecting their grievances towards the next election, which could be some time away.
Pheu Thai did not escape unscathed. Its leader, prime minister Srettha Thavisin, was dismissed because of an ethics probe widely believed to be politically motivated. Conspiracy theories abound as to why Srettha was targeted, ranging from speculation about a “deal” with Thaksin to install his daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra, to Thailand’s royalist-military political establishment needing Paetongtarn as a “political hostage“’ to keep Thaksin in line. Either way, Pheu Thai — already struggling to lead its nine-party governing coalition — was beleaguered by the ordeal.
The Senate and the Constitutional Court — nominally understood as bulwarks of democracy and institutional protection against the tyranny of the majority — rarely serve their purposes in Thailand. The upper house was cleverly set up to serve the interests of the military junta, which appointed its 250 members after the 2014 coup. It successfully blocked the MFP from coming to power after the 2023 election and has historically stood in the way of democratically elected governments.
The Constitutional Court has long engaged in autocratic judicial activism by intervening in democratic processes, including undermining elections and the rule of law. Its politicisation has led the judicial system as a whole to lose its popular legitimacy as an institution serving the people’s interests.
Most Thais no longer trust the Constitutional Court to be impartial, transparent or just and would not count on it to uphold the interests of the people. Its interventions against the MFP and Pheu Thai on dubious legal grounds have shown yet again the outsized reach of the country’s highest court in matters that can hardly be justified.
The new premier, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, is unlikely to restore democracy and the rule of law given her weakened position as the country’s new leader. She has never possessed democratic ambitions for Thailand. Her government will focus on keeping the coalition together, further developing their signature policies like the Digital Wallet initiative and rebuilding the Pheu Thai brand.
Republished from EAST ASIA FORUM, September 05, 2024
Aim Sinpeng
Dr Aim Sinpeng is Associate Professor in Comparative Politics in the Discipline of Government and International Relations at the University of Sydney.
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