Pearls and Irritations

The AUKUS agreement is controversial. It covers advanced military technologies whose future is contested by experts. There is also a vigorous discussion over whether the agreement has compromised Australia’s autonomy on strategic policy making and implementation. Yet this latter debate completely misses why AUKUS is at risk of failure.

AUKUS’ “Tier One” objective is to develop the capacity of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) to operate nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). An initial step in this process is the transfer of three American SSNs to Australia from around 2032 until the late 2030s.

A group of critics, including former ALP government luminaries, allege that these processes have undermined Australia’s sovereignty, security and strategic policy. Further, these alleged concessions have been made despite questions over whether the US can supply the Virginia-class SSNs.

These are weighty issues, but the American SSNs are not AUKUS. SSN-AUKUS is an Anglo-Australian submarine, still being designed, of which it is planned to build at least five in Adelaide from the late 2020s for delivery from the early 2040s (ASA SSN-AUKUS Fact sheet).

Even if achieved, this schedule would leave a gap between the retirement of the current Collins-class submarines and the advent of SSN-AUKUS. The American submarines are an interim solution to this problem.

As they also will be introducing the RAN to nuclear propulsion, this part of the program includes the basing of US SSNs at HMAS Stirling to build Australian familiarity with the technology. Training of eventually over 400 RAN submarine personnel, including integration into US submarine crews, has already commenced.

It’s what happens with the British role that could see the whole thing fall apart. Currently Defence Minister Richard Marles is in the UK to negotiate a treaty covering the Anglo-Australian arrangements to manage the SSN-AUKUS program. He’s dealing with a country of much diminished capacity.

Recently the Royal Navy (RN) had of its five Astute-class SSNs available for operational service.

One was a new boat on acceptance trials, but the rest were moored alongside awaiting maintenance. Some had been waiting for a long time; so long that the collective time spent in or waiting to access maintenance totalled five years and nine months.

This is symptomatic of a system that has lost skills, leadership or focus, or all of those.

Earlier this year the RN had to advertise for the position of Director of Submarines. This post is responsible for the management and development of the RN’s submarine fleet. In a service operating both attack (SSN) and ballistic missile (SSBN) nuclear-powered submarines, there was no officer suitable for promotion to the position.

Since the end of the Cold War, the RN submarine force and its personnel have been more than halved, its maintenance facilities left to atrophy, its acquisition programs disorganised by budgetary restraint and its building workforce wasted to 23 per cent of its former strength.

This is supposed to be the future of AUKUS!

An Astute-class SSN is scheduled to be based in HMAS Stirling from 2027, with RAN personnel trained aboard RN submarines and support facilities. Britain’s ability to implement and sustain these goals seems tenuous.

The chances of Britain providing a workable template for the construction of SSN-AUKUS in Australia look equally dubious. Design is underway and GBP 4 billion (~ A$8 billion) has been allocated for work out to 2028.

Yet the ambition faces huge obstacles. It has taken the British more than 10 years on average to build and commission the Astute-class SSNs. The 7-boat construction program commenced in January 2001 (two years before the commissioning of the RAN’s 6th Collins-class submarine), and will not be completed until late 2026. By comparison, average construction time for the Collins-class submarines was 7 years, and the US constructs the Virginia-class SSNs in 5 years.

Three of the UK’s four 17,000 tonne Dreadnought-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines (SSBN) are now under construction.The production cycle of these vessels is expected to occupy British shipyards into the 2040s.

The UK MoD’s Major Projects data suggests there is a serious risk that the reactor core production project at Rolls-Royce in Derby could cause delays in the Dreadnought program. Rolls-Royce is also the supplier for the reactors for SSN-AUKUS.

Construction of the Dreadnought-class SSBNs will not only occupy British shipyards but also gorge on the nation’s defence budgets. Despite increased defence outlays, the British 10 year procurement plan is now so much over budget that it has been branded as unaffordable. The dominant contributor is the escalating cost of the Dreadnought program.

Consequently, the UK Ministry of Defence’s own financial management division expects savings from other equipment programs, such as a GBP 1 billion underspend on the maintenance of the current submarine fleet. This is a clear indication of the risk that the RN’s ability to support the RAN’s nuclear transition will be compromised or even evaporate.

More concerning is the saving from delays the MoD expects in the SSN-AUKUS program. Already, expenditure of some GBP 2 billion is projected to be deferred to beyond the current ten year plan. That is, until after 2033, much later than the expected beginning of SSN-AUKUS construction in Australia. We don’t know the nature of the projected shortfalls, but their impact will not help the Australian program maintain schedules and costs.

Once the scope of British incapacity becomes apparent, Australia will probably attempt to exercise its option to receive two additional Virginia-class SSNs. At that point the future of AUKUS becomes tenuous.

Will it be viable to build just three SSN-AUKUS SSNs in Australia? Will it be possible for the RAN to operate parallel fleets of different SSNs? If it were decided to build onwards with the SSN-AUKUS class from a delayed schedule, will the technology remain viable or relevant in the 2050s when new boats would still be entering service?

The probability is that at this point, at some time in the late 2030s, the entire AUKUS project will be rethought.

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