Translation and violence: thoughts about the Taiwan and the 1972 Joint Communique

Jul 22, 2024
China and Taiwan relationship illustration. Shadow of China's.

The Australia China Joint Communique of December 1972 is the foundational document underpinning bilateral relations ever since. It is not a long document, and at a cursory glance appears quite simple. Recently, however, some commentators have questioned its language and suggested it is ambiguous, particularly concerning our government’s position on the status of Taiwan.

A declassified secret diplomatic cable throws some light on the delicate negotiations that took place in Paris in December 1972, and former ambassador John Burgess has written a detailed account, published in this Journal in 2021. Regarding the language used in the communique, the Department of Foreign Affairs Chinese linguist Charles Lee and his scholarly wife Nancy were expert participants in the talks and addressed the possibility of misunderstandings or ambiguities. Colleagues of the Lees and Nancy’s later students who followed distinguished careers in the Department will attest to their absolute competence. The final agreed document was signed by the Australian Ambassador to France Alan Renouf, who became Secretary of the Department two years later. In an obituary, Cavan Hogue described him as a “forthright … key player in the negotiations for Australia’s recognition of China. This was done quietly but, as always, very effectively.”

Australian officials proposed to follow the formula used by Canada, which had just recently established diplomatic relations with Beijing, that is to “take note” of its position concerning the status of Taiwan. This was rejected by the Chinese side. The critical third paragraph of the agreed Communique states:

“The Australian Government recognises the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledges the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is a province of the People’ s Republic of China, and has decided to remove its official representation from Taiwan before 25 January 1973.” This is the formula that had been used by Britain, which had recently reached an agreement to upgrade its diplomatic representation in Beijing to ambassadorial status.

The Chinese language version of the communique uses the expression chengren 承认accepts”, “admits”, “agrees”, “approves”, “recognises”, “avouches” or “confesses”, none of which seems more appropriate in this case. Basically, chengren means that the subject agrees that something is true. A communique is technically a less-than-treaty status document, therefore not legally binding, but DFAT guidance notes emphasise that, to avoid misunderstandings, “it is important that the intentions of the participants is clear”. I am no lawyer, but it seems to me that there is a common and plain meaning of the word “acknowledge” and the intention is certainly clear.

Furthermore, the second paragraph of the communique sets out the basis for the development of diplomatic relations on the basis of agreed “principles”. The Chinese language version uses the expression yuanze 原则. This is always translated as “principle” or “principles” and never as “policy” (Chinese zhengce 政策or fangzhen 方针). In other words, even if stated obliquely, the Joint Communique refers to a “One China principle”, not a “One China policy”

The reader surely appreciates the difference between principle and policy. For instance, a company may espouse the principle of gender equality in employment, but this will not be effective unless it adopts policies that apply to its workforce. Again, both government and opposition parties may agree on the principle that climate change must be addressed, but they are likely to differ on policies to address the issue.

This is not a linguistic conundrum, but some people are confusing the two words, with unstated intentions. In Washington, a particular line is being developed by the powerful Taiwan lobby, and in May this year Republican Senator Jim Risch introduced a resolution reaffirming US support for Taiwan on the basis of the United States having a “One China policy” and not “the ‘One China Principle’ of the Chinese Communist Party.”

Australian academic Benjamin Herscovitch is another who cannot distinguish between principle and policy. In a recent online post, he claims that Australia upholds the “One China policy” and not the “One China principle” and accuses the Chinese government of making exaggerated claims to the contrary. He cites the statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reporting the 17 June meeting between Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Premier Li Qiang, which refers to the “One China principle”, and he distinguishes this from the Australian side’s report of the same meeting, which states that “both sides reiterated the importance of the Joint Communique and restated their commitment to their respective national policies and positions contained therein.” Principle surely underpins policy. How could government policies contradict principles? The Joint Communique refers to principles and acknowledges/recognises/agrees “that Taiwan is a province of the People’s Republic of China”. Policies have been developed since from that foundation.

A character in Rebecca Kuang’s recent novel Babel: Or the Necessity of Violence, about the role of translation in the service of imperialism and politics, says, “Translation means doing violence upon the original. It means warping and distorting it for foreign, unintended eyes. So, where does that leave us? How can we conclude except by acknowledging that an act of translation is always an act of betrayal?” In the case of diplomatic documents, this statement is excruciatingly relevant. 

Let us not get drawn into the violence of the US-China relationship.

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