When Election Day ended in Taiwan the local and foreign media, pundits, and others almost in unison reported Vice President Lai and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party won handily, democracy had prevailed, and China (which opposed Lai and interfered in the campaign) lost, and the scene might escalate into conflict and even war.
But the election and Taiwan’s politics are considerably more complicated than this.
Vice President Lai Ching-te, representing the ruling Democratic Progressive Party, indeed won the popular vote. The other two contestants immediately acknowledged defeat. With some caveats it was a clear victory for Lai.
Lai was aided by unity in the ruling party and the support of President Tsai Ing-wen. She could not run for reelection owing to term limits and named Lai her successor. He was also advantaged by a stellar reputation for handling affairs in offices he had held up to this time. In addition, he is good looking: photogenic and owns the appearance of someone young and energetic. Finally, he inspired voters during the campaign and handled issues deftly.
Last but not least, Lai’s vice-presidential running mate, Hsiao Bi-khim, had just left the position of Taiwan’s diplomatic representative to the United States where she had made friends and built a fine reputation. The two were a good match.
Hou You-yi was the candidate of the Nationalist Party (or Kuomintang, KMT) He had a background in law enforcement and dealing with security matters. Recently he was the most popular among Taiwan’s six metropolitan mayors. He appealed to residents concerned about crime and national security. The KMT, Taiwan’s main opposition party and its long ruling and most experienced political party, provided Hou with campaign organisers, expertise, and a base of support.
However, at the outset Hou’s campaign suffered from poor planning and disorganisation and he fell behind Vice President Lai in the polls. So, he sought a unity campaign with the head of Taiwan’s third largest party, reckoning that by joining forces they could defeat Lai. The two appealed to voters that favored closer ties with China to avoid conflict or war. The polls showed that together they had more voter support than Lai. However, their agreement collapsed and the two went their separate ways.
Hou won only 33 percent of the popular vote, and a disappointing second place.
Ko Wen-je was the third candidate for president, He was a famous doctor that had brought new medical procedures to Taiwan and initiated cooperation in the field of medicine with China and the United States. He founded the Taiwan People’s Party In 2019. He then ran for mayor of Taipei and won with the help of the DPP. But their relationship collapsed over the DPP perceiving him as too pro-China. He subsequently ran for reelection as an independent and won.
Ko and his party attracted support from voters that were dissatisfied with the two major parties—a significant portion of residents in Taiwan. He also appealed to young voters.
Regarding the agreement with Hou and the KMT to field a unity ticket Ko came to feel he and his party would be a pawn and terminated the deal.
Ko won 26 percent of the popular vote, which was above expectations.
As mentioned above there were some differences about the narrative of Vice President Lai’s clear cut victory,
The main one was the fact the DPP lost its majority in the legislative. Simultaneously, the KMT gained 14 seats. The TPP gained 3 seats for a total of 8.
With likely cooperation between the other two parties, the DPP and Lai will face divided government. This will make governing harder. This may well result in political paralysis and serious gridlock. One is reminded of the situation when Chen Shui-bian served as president (2000 to 2008) without a majority in the legislature. He was plagued by constant fighting with the opposition.
Further, Vice President Lai won but 40 percent of the popular vote, a questionable mandate. In 1996 when Taiwan had its first direct presidential election, President Lee Teng-hui was said to not have a mandate if he did not get 50 percent of the vote. The idea ended when he got more than 50 percent. Incidentally, President Chen got 40 percent.
The narrative that the election advanced Taiwan’s democracy also needs some explanation. For sure Taiwan’s democratic system makes it a beacon on the mountain top, especially in the setting of democracies failing around the world, including in the U.S., according to Liberty House. Yet the Tsai administration advantaged by its first ever majority in the legislature, passed two laws that to many scholars sullied Taiwan’s democracy,
At bar were the Anti-Ill-gotten Funds Act passed in 2016. It disabled the KMT financially to the degree it could not pay the pensions of its employees and was hobbled in running election campaigns. In the process this made the DPP Taiwan’s richest party, which together with its prevailing influence with the media gave the DPP a huge advantage vis-à-vis the KMT. The Anti-Infiltration Act passed just before the 2020 election had a similar impact by making it illegal to speak or act in favor of China, thereby limiting free speech.
Finally, the China and U.S, “factors” were different from what was reported during the campaign and post-election. For sure, Chinese leaders vilified Lai. But Lai seriously softened his advocacy of independence during the campaign and instead spoke of important ties with China and peace in the Taiwan Strait. Counterpointwise, Beijing could not see the other parties pushing unification; they supported only maintaining the status quo and friendly ties with China.
Most important, it has long been China’s fundamental strategy to unify Taiwan via economic ties. President Tsai sought to wean Taiwan from dependency on China, but failed. Cross-Strait commerce grew by l5 to 20 percent during her tenure. Taiwan’s economic growth is puny and in the next few years will be even more reliant on trade with China. Beijing does not need or want a war.
Finally, the U.S., Taiwan’s savior and protector, is pursuing a rapprochement with China, which brought into question its loyalty to Taiwan as witnessed by President Biden proclaiming a one China policy at the APEC conference in November and following that up with new military discussions and other friendly China policies.
In conclusion, assessing Taiwan’s January election is a more tangled affair than it appears.
John F. Copper
John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor (emeritus) of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of more than thirty-five books on Taiwan and U.S. China/Taiwan policy, including the seventh edition of Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Routledge) just over a year ago and Taiwan’s Politics in Action (World Scientific) early in 2021.
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